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No More Ping-Pong: The Need for Article III Status in
Bankruptcy After Stern v. Marshall
Latoya C. Brown*
“Unfortunately, Stern v. Marshall has become the mantra of every litigant who, for strategic or tactical reasons, would rather litigate some1
where other than the bankruptcy court.”
I. INTRODUCTION
Quite aptly, the United States Supreme Court borrowed the
words of Charles Dickens to describe the life of the case that ultimate2
ly resulted in Stern v. Marshall: “This suit has, in the curse of time,
become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it
for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the
3
4
premises.’” Ironically, even after the Court’s decision, the “curse” has
continued and many, especially those of the bankruptcy bar, are in
disagreement as to the ultimate outcome and unforeseen consequenc5
es of Stern.
6
The “big fuss” arose out of the Court’s holding that bankruptcy
courts do not have constitutional authority to enter final judgment on
*
J.D., 2013. I thank Professor Jerry Markham for serving as my faculty advisor on this
paper and for his invaluable insight.
1
In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (5-4 decision).
3
Id. at 2600 (quoting 1 CHARLES DICKENS, Bleak House, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES
DICKENS 4, 4-5 (illustrated ed. 1891)).
4
Id.
5
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
6
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“If our decision today does not change all that much, then why
the fuss?”). As bankruptcy courts begin to deal with the many issues left unresolved by Stern,
and as litigants, justifiably or unjustifiably, continue to challenge the authority of bankruptcy
courts citing Stern, Justice Roberts’s assertion that Stern ‘does not change much’ has become
quite inexplicable. As Professor Kuney neatly puts it, “Justice Breyer may not have been able to
command a majority of the court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he has definitely
been right about one thing: Justice Roberts’s statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v.
Marshall decision ‘does not change all that much’ was either tongue-in-cheek or decidedly incorrect.” George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act’s Summary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, art. 1, 9 (2012) (citing
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620).
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a state law counterclaim “that is not resolved in the process of ruling
7
on a creditor’s proof of claim.” The Court stated that common law
claims, as well as suits in equity and admiralty, fall within the province
of Article III courts, and Congress cannot “chip away at the authority
8
of the judicial branch” by enacting statutes delegating such power to
9
non-Article III judges. The Constitution grants judicial power to
courts whose judges enjoy tenure during good behavior and salary
10
protections.
Article III provisions are safeguards against intrusion by other
branches of government and they ensure that judicial decisions are
11
being made with “[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts.” A different
outcome would have been likely if the case involved a ‘public right’
because the Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to
12
adjudicate in suits involving that exception. The public rights exception applies in cases where a “right is integrally related to particular
13
federal government action.”
Other than the obvious limiting effect that Stern will have on
bankruptcy courts with regards to adjudicating common law claims,
the decision raises other concerns; specifically, the decision suggests
that the Court may entertain other constitutional challenges to Con14
gress’s grant of authority to bankruptcy judges. Such scrutiny of
bankruptcy courts is not novel, however, given that Article III judges
started questioning the legitimacy of bankruptcy judges as early as the
15
1970s. Some scholars have theorized that the “denial of Article III
16
power and prestige to the bankruptcy court” is the result of an arbitrary hierarchy of power in the judicial system of the United States
17
and a stigma that attached to bankruptcy early on in the practice.
7

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
Id.
9
See id. at 2594.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
11 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)).
12 See Den (ex dem. Murray) v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
13 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613.
14 See In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 709 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“But
the Supreme Court, foreshadowing its ultimate holding, then observes: ‘We agree with Pierce
that designating all counterclaims as ‘core’ proceedings raises serious constitutional concerns.’”)
(quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605).
15 See Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural Context of Debt: A Critical Analysis of
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 194-95 (2011); see also
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 2 (1979) (providing an in depth look at the making of the fifth bankruptcy law of the
United States and the reaction of certain members of the Judiciary).
16 Coco, supra note 15, at 184-88.
17 Id. at 186-91.
8
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Stern has created a buzz in the media, academic settings and at
18
19
bar, leading Chief Justice Roberts to ask, “Why all the fuss?” There
are a number of responses to the Chief Justice’s question. Among the
criticisms and concerns, some believe Stern will result in: (1) a less efficient process in bankruptcy courts and increase in case overload in
20
21
federal district courts; (2) forum shopping; (3) a prolongation of the
22
tension between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges; (4) separa23
tion of powers issues; and (5) misunderstanding as to the role consent
24
plays in bankruptcy proceedings.
This article takes a closer look at Stern in Part I, and highlights
the key rationale for the Court’s holding. Part I also briefly examines
applicable legislative history, as well as prior cases that led the majority to take the position it did in Stern. In Part II, the article addresses
the concerns that are being voiced by judges and scholars regarding
Stern’s outcome. This article explores these criticisms and ultimately
concludes that these issues stem from the current structure of the
25
American bifurcated, hybrid bankruptcy system, and are not unique
by-products of the Stern decision.

18 See, e.g., In re CD Liquidation Co., 462 B.R. 124, 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“During the
pendency of the briefing on the Injunction Motion, the United States Supreme Court decided
Stern v. Marshall . . . a ruling which created great uncertainty within the bankruptcy bench and
bar.”); Michael Moody & Arthur Spector, Anna Nicole Smith Decision Affects Court’s Authority,
DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 23, 2011, at A8; John Pacenti, Justice Watch: Anna Nicole Twist Put Into
Rothstein Case, DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 8, 2011, at A3 (quoting United States Bankruptcy Judge
A. Jay Cristol that the Justices “don’t always understand fully what we are doing in bankruptcy . .
. [Stern] is going to complicate a number of cases”); Stephen J. Lubben, Messing With the Bankruptcy System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/08/26/messing-with-the-bankruptcy-system/.
19 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“If our decision today does not change all
that much, then why the fuss?”).
20 See infra note 170.
21 See infra note 188.
22 See Coco, supra note 15, at 186-91.
23 See infra note 223.
24 See, e.g., Richard Lieb, The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, by Applying Article III
of the Constitution Further Limited the Statutory Authority of Bankruptcy Courts to Issue Final
Orders, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4, art. 1, 2 (2011) (“Although not directly addressed by the majority, it is unclear whether express consent by the parties is, by itself, a sufficient basis upon
which a bankruptcy judge may adjudicate a common law claim.”).
25 See G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New
Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 511, 515 (2010) (explaining that
American bankruptcy laws constructed a hybrid system comprised of federal and state laws);
Melodie Freeman-Burney, Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Summing
Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167, 179-83 (1986) (describing the bifurcated structure of the bankruptcy system, where district courts retain judicial power of the United States and bankruptcy
courts are units of the district court, thereby making bankruptcy judges judicial officers of the
district court).
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Under the current system, Congress has granted jurisdiction over
26
bankruptcy to the district courts. The district courts may refer cases
27
to bankruptcy courts, which function as units of the district courts.
Bankruptcy proceedings involve substantive entitlements and rules
28
based on state laws. A bankruptcy judge must then decide whether
29
the proceeding is a core or non-core proceeding. The practical effect
of such a distinction is that a bankruptcy judge may enter final orders
in core proceedings, but may only submit proposed findings of fact
30
and conclusions of law in non-core proceedings. A lot of uncertainty
31
revolves around the designation of core versus non-core proceedings.
This hybrid system and the vagaries of the Bankruptcy Code (“the
Code”), therefore, give rise to efficiency concerns, forum shopping
problems, constitutional questions, and other issues.
Further, as one court stated, Stern may not be that big of a surprise, since the Supreme Court “had already expressed its constitu32
tional concerns in Northern Pipeline.” Stern, therefore, only echoes
the Supreme Court’s prior statement that the constitutional separa33
tion of powers must be revered. The decision only conjures up, and,
to some extent, exacerbates the many unresolved problems plaguing
34
the American bankruptcy system.
Finally, in Part III, this article proposes a solution to the
longstanding issue of bankruptcy courts’ authority in the United
States. This section concludes that Congress should bestow the Bankruptcy Court with Article III status. Such a grant will cure further jurisdictional issues and also resolve many of the concerns being voiced
35
in light of Stern – as well as those voiced decades before.

26 Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 383, 387 (2005).
27 Id.
28 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25.
29 Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 391.
30 Id.
31 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25, at 519-20. See, e.g., In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R.
318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“My frustration with Stern is that it offers virtually no insight
as to how to recalibrate the core/non-core dichotomy . . . .”).
32 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 322 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
33 Id.
34 See supra notes 18 and 25.
35 See infra notes 184-223.

2013]

The Need for Article III Status in Bankruptcy after Stern

563

II. EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S JURISDICTION
A. In the Beginning
The concept of providing relief for the economically burdened is
36
as old as civilization itself. The first known law in recorded history
that provided for the relief of debtors from their debts is found in the
37
book of Deuteronomy, chapter 15. Prior to the enactment of Cessio
Bonorum under Cesar, which abolished capital punishment, slavery
and imprisonment for insolvent debtors, the Roman Law of the Twelve
Tablets (451-450 B.C.) allowed creditors to carve up the bodies of their
38
insolvent debtors and share the pieces proportionately. To the extent
that Cessio Bonorum permitted financially distressed debtors, who
had acted in good faith, to turn over remaining assets to their creditors
and gain immunity from imprisonment or physical punishment, this
39
body of law can be said to be a prototype of modern bankruptcy law.
During the Middle Ages, the Hanseatic League, the most successful league of merchant associations, would banish debtors who could
40
not meet their obligations. Another approach in some communities
was to put the debtor to public shame by writing the debtor’s name in
41
a crowded commercial district and ringing the ‘shame bell’. In Lombardy, Italy, where traders and bankers conducted their business from
benches or stalls in an open market, these traders would break the
42
business bench of a debtor as a symbol of failure.
In England, bankruptcy laws were quasi-criminal in nature and
43
were creatures of statute. Debt was considered immoral and fraudulent: the first English Bankruptcy Act of 1542 referred to the debtor as

36 David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis Of Insolvency Laws
And Their Impact On The Role, Power, And Jurisdiction Of Today’s United States Bankruptcy
Court And Its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 166 (2000).
37 Id. (citing Deuteronomy 15:1-4 (“At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a
release. And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto his neighbor shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbor, or his brother; because it is called the
Lord’s release. Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again; but that which is thine with thy brother
thine hand shall release; save when there shall be no poor among you.”)).
38 Id. at 167.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 168.
41 Id.
42 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 168 (explaining that these Italian traders and bankers
soon discovered the rich business opportunities in England and started to migrate there, bringing
their customs with them, including the practice of breaking the bench). The word ‘bankrupt’ is
the Anglicized version of ‘broken bench.’ Id.
43 Id. at 168-69.
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“the offender,” and an act in 1570 treated debtors as criminals. The
statute of Queen Anne, passed in 1705, decriminalized bankruptcy law
45
and allowed for the discharge of debts. This Statute was in effect at
the time the forefathers suspended their relationship with England
46
and established the United States of America. Though the Industrial
47
Revolution brought more favorable perceptions of bankruptcy, the
stigma attached to debt and debtors was transferred nonetheless to
48
American society.
B.

Development in American Jurisprudence

Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy proceedings were
conducted by referees — later called bankruptcy judges — who were
officers of the district court and appointed and removed by the dis49
tricts courts. The limited jurisdiction of the referees under the Act
became a major obstacle to the efficient administration of bankruptcy
50
cases. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“Reform Act”) was
therefore enacted to address this concern; the purpose of the Reform
Act was to expand the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and provide a
single forum for the adjudication of all issues related to the admin51
istration of a bankruptcy case.
The Reform Act granted United States bankruptcy judges “original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and original, nonexclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’
52
or ‘related to’ cases under the Bankruptcy Reform Act . . . .” The
53
bankruptcy court was to be a separate entity from the district court.
54
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the
Court found this attempt to broaden the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts unconstitutional on the basis that Congress cannot imbue Article I courts with authority to make final rulings on common law claims

44 An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542)
(Eng.); An Acte Touchyng Orders for Banckruptes, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.); Kennedy & Clift,
supra note 36, at 168-69.
45 Queen Anne’s Act, 4 Anne, c. 17 (1705) (Eng.); Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 16970.
46 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 170.
47 Id.
48 See Coco, supra note 15, at 187-209.
49 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979); Daley & Shuster,
supra note 26, at 384-85.
50 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 385.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 386.
53 Id.
54 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

2013]

The Need for Article III Status in Bankruptcy after Stern

565

55

in the absence of Article III protections. To remedy the Reform
Act’s jurisdictional problems, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
56
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Under the Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, following referral from the federal district
court, a bankruptcy court must determine if the matter involves a core
57
proceeding or a non-core proceeding.
In non-core proceedings, or those “related to” title 11 cases, the
bankruptcy court may hear the matter and propose findings of facts
58
and conclusions of law to the district court. An action is ‘related to’
bankruptcy if the “outcome might have a conceivable effect on the
59
estate.” In core proceedings, which “arise in” a case under title 11 or
60
“arise under” title 11, a bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment.
“A core proceeding is a proceeding that ‘invokes a substantive right
provided by title 11’ or one that, ‘by its nature, could arise only in the
61
context of a bankruptcy case.’” In other words, claims that have no
existence outside of bankruptcy, or which would not exist but for
62
bankruptcy, are said to “arise in” bankruptcy. Under 28 U.S.C. §
63
157(b)(2)(C), “counterclaims by [a debtor’s] estate against persons
55

Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 387.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); see Daley & Shuster,
supra note 26, at 387.
57 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(c) (2008) (found unconstitutional as applied by Stern v. Marshall, 131
S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011)); see Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, And Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 795-96
(1994).
58 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2008); see Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.
59 In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
60 28 U.S.C. 157(b) (2008); see Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.
61 In re Fairchild Corp., 452 B.R. 525, 530 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). There is much debate
surrounding the distinction between core and non-core proceedings, and courts arrive at that
demarcation using different rationales. For example, in In re USDigital, the court adopted the
Third Circuit’s two-step process to aid in its determination of whether a claim is a core proceeding: “First, a court must consult § 157(b) to determine if the claim at issue fits within that provision’s illustrative list of proceedings that may be considered core. If so, a proceeding is core [1] if
it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or [2] if it is a proceeding, that by its nature,
could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case. The two-part second element of the test
must be met for a proceeding to be core, regardless of whether it is enumerated in section
157(b)(2).” In re USDigital, Inc., 461 B.R. 276, 284-85 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (alterations in original) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
Expounding on the issue, the court further stated: “Why would the Third Circuit create an
arguably superfluous element to its test? This Court believes that the Third Circuit—like the
Ninth—was seeking to establish a test covering both the statute and the Constitution. Stern has
divided the Court’s inquiry into two elements: statutory and constitutional. But, given the overlap between the enumerated core proceedings and the second element of the Third Circuit’s test,
this Court finds it to be an appropriate measure in determining whether a matter is a nonenumerated core proceeding.” Id. at 285 n.42.
62 See In re McClelland, 460 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
63 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2008).
56
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64

filing claims against the estate” are core proceedings, which means
bankruptcy courts are granted statutory authority to enter final judg65
ment on such claims. This provision was the source of the conflict in
66
Stern.
C.

Recent Limitations on Bankruptcy Courts’ Jurisdiction
67

In Stern, the Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) violated
Article III of the Constitution, and held that bankruptcy courts
“lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a
state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a
68
creditor’s proof of claim.” Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole
Smith) brought an action in a Texas probate court, prior to the death
of her husband, Howard Marshall, against her stepson, E. Pierce Marshall, alleging that Pierce fraudulently induced Howard to sign a living
69
trust that did not include her. Pierce denied any such conduct on his
70
part.
After Howard’s death, and while the probate case was pending,
Vickie filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy
71
Court for the Central District of California. Pierce brought a defamation suit against Vickie in the bankruptcy proceeding, to which
Vickie asserted truth as a defense and raised a counterclaim for tor72
tious interference.
The bankruptcy court entered judgment in Vickie’s favor on the
73
tortious interference counterclaim. On appeal, Pierce argued that
74
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim.
The district court found that the bankruptcy court did have statutory
authority, but concluded that, as a constitutional matter, the counter75
claim should not have been characterized as core. The district court,
therefore, treated the bankruptcy court’s judgment as proposed rather
than final, engaged in an independent review of the record, and even-

64

Id.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.
66 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603-08 (2011).
67 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2008).
68 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
69 Id. at 2601.
70 Id.
71 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25, at 522-23. Vickie’s filing of a petition for bankruptcy was
in response to a default judgment of $884,607.98 that was entered against her in a sexual harassment suit brought by her former housekeeper.
72 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2602.
75 Id.
65
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tually ruled in Vickie’s favor. Interestingly, the district court chose to
disregard the judgment of the Texas probate court, which had reached
77
a final resolution and entered judgment in Pierce’s favor. The appellate court reversed the district court’s ruling, but on different
78
grounds.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(C) allowed the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on
79
Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim. Nevertheless, the Court
found that such statutory grant of authority to bankruptcy courts was
80
in contravention of Article III. Article III requires that the judicial
powers of the United States vest “in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts” established by Congress, and also provides salary and
81
tenure protections. The bankruptcy judgeship was created under Article I and is not afforded any Article III protections – that is, tenure
82
and salary guarantees. Article III protections, the Court reasoned,
are elemental in the constitutional system of checks and balances, and
83
both define and protect the independence of the judiciary. “[T]he
Framers sought to ensure that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the
executive, but rather with ‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts’ deemed
84
essential to good judges.”
Hence, Congress cannot assign to legislative courts any matter
which “is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity, or admiralty” and brought “within the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” because
85
responsibility for such matters rests with Article III judges. The only
exception to this general rule regards cases in which the ‘public rights’
86
doctrine is applicable. The doctrine applies in cases where the claim
being litigated is integrally related to a particular government action,
87
and derives from a federal regulatory scheme. In Stern, Vickie’s
counterclaim was simply a state tort action that was not “derived from
88
or dependent on bankruptcy law.” The Court, therefore, concluded
that Congress exceeded its authority, and held that the “Bankruptcy
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id. at 2605.
Id. at 2608.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
Id. at 2609.
Id.
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2613.
Id. at 2618.
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Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of
89
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 28
90
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional. The dissent, penned by
Justice Breyer, stated that the Court deviated from prior precedent –
more specifically, from Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
91
92
Schor and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. –
which allowed for a more pragmatic approach in determining the ad93
judicatory authority of a non-Article III judge. In Thomas, the Court
emphasized that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Arti94
cle III.” Expounding on this principle, the Court in Schor, after conceding that adjudication of the counterclaim by the administrative
court might be of the kind traditionally decided by an Article III
judge, concluded that ‘de minimis’ intrusion on the judicial branch was
permissible to avoid practical negative consequences of a formalistic
95
approach. In Schor, a customer filed reparations complaints with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) against his com96
modity futures broker. The broker counterclaimed by seeking recov97
ery of debit balances on the customer’s account. Ultimately, the
Court held that the CFTC could entertain the state law counterclaim
98
in the reparation proceedings, without violating Article III.
Therefore, the dissent’s position in Stern was that the statutory
grant of authority to a bankruptcy court, which allows it to adjudicate
compulsory counterclaims, should be permissible in light of Schor and
99
Thomas. The dissent further reasoned that, at most, the intrusion on
100
Article III turf was de minimis, and hence, permissible. To substantiate this point, the dissent argued that although the counterclaim in
Stern resembled a kind normally decided by Article III courts, the mitigating factor was that bankruptcy courts often decide “claims that
101
similarly resemble various common-law actions.” In addition, con89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
Id. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lieb, supra note 24, at 463.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 853-56.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 837-38.
Id. at 841.
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2628-29.
Id. at 2626.
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trary to the majority’s assertion, bankruptcy judges are not prone to
improper influence by the other branches of government because
bankruptcy judges are appointed by Article III judges, may be removed by Article III judges, and have their salaries “pegged to those
102
of the federal district judges.”
The dissent also pointed out that bankruptcy proceedings are supervised and controlled by Article III courts, and parties are free to
103
appeal to the district court. Furthermore, the parties in Stern con104
sented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Pierce could have
brought his claim in a state or federal court, but chose to bring it in
105
the bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, the dissent highlighted the
fact that Congress’s grant of authority over counterclaims to bankruptcy courts was an important means of carrying out its Article 1,
106
section 8 power : these counterclaims often have more than “some
bearing on a bankruptcy case,” and hence, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) is
107
important for an efficient and effective bankruptcy system. Finally,
the dissent argued that contrary to the majority’s contention that the
decision in Stern would not change much, as a practical matter, it will
108
create an inefficient and costly bankruptcy system.
III. APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF STERN ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE
Bankruptcy judges, members of the bankruptcy bar, and the me109
dia have been in a frenzy since the decision was rendered in Stern.
The flurry is partly because the case “has a narrow holding, but potentially enormous implications for bankruptcy courts and litigation in
110
the federal courts.” There are those, however, who posit that Stern

102

Id. at 2627.
Id.
104 Id. at 2627-28.
105 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
106 Id. at 2628.
107 Id. at 2629.
108 Id. at 2630.
109 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Turturici v. Nat’l Mortg. Servicing, LP,
No. CIV S-10-2853 KJM, 2011 WL 4480169, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011) (acknowledging
the potentially enormous impact of Stern); In re Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 638
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“There are two views as to the effect and holding of Stern . . . . In the face
of confusion, the Court as have many others throughout the nation, will attempt to present a
reasoned analysis of the issues before it, based on this Court’s interpretation of Stern.”). The
court in In re Direct Response further noted that: “The Court has found in excess of 130 cases in
which bankruptcy courts have addressed Stern. The analyses and decisions are not consistent.”
In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 638 n.7.
110 Erwin Chemerinsky, Enormous Confusion, NAT’L. L.J., Aug. 29, 2011, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202512531253&slreturn=1. Chemerinsky also
103
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will not change anything about how bankruptcy law is practiced. But
112
for others, “bombshell does fairly describe Stern’s impact upon the
more practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what
113
the Code still calls [them] to do.” Overall, many speculate that Stern
114
will have an adverse effect on bankruptcy practice. Part A of this
section briefly examines the major trends in the interpretation and
application of Stern. Part B explores the various consequences being
promulgated by those at bar and by the media, and concludes that
these problems are not novelties of Stern. Rather, these are latent
concerns in existence since the inception of modern bankruptcy courts
and a by-product of the structure of the American bankruptcy system.
A. Interpretation
1. Dicta or Holding?
Stern’s frenzied reception is fueled by disagreement on what the
115
case ultimately means. The broad multifarious rationales in the deci116
sion leave many open-ended questions on the one hand, and, on the
117
other hand, require pause for courts trying to make sense of it all.
An inventory of cases post-Stern, reveals that the decision has been
118
subject to both a broad and a narrow interpretation : the difference in
interpretation basically boils down to how much weight a court de119
cides to give the dicta in Stern.

noted that: “Stern v. Marshall made news only because it involved Anna Nicole Smith. But few Supreme Court decisions will have a larger impact on the day-to-day work of judges and lawyers.” Id.
111 See, e.g., Dan Schechter, Statutory Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Hear and Determine
Compulsory State-Law Counterclaims Against Non-Bankrupt Claimants is Unconstitutional.
[Stern v. Marshall, (U.S.).], 2011 COM. FIN. NEWSL. 51 (2011) (“I think the majority is right about
at least one thing: in the long run, this is not going to be a game changer.”).
112 See supra note 18.
113 In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
114 See supra note 18.
115 See, e.g., In re McClelland, 460 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The work is compounded by the failure of the Supreme Court to definitively rule that the bankruptcy court is
empowered by the “public rights” doctrine to make final adjudications regarding matters that
are fundamentally concerned with the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations.”).
116 In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC, No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098, at *2 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. Nov. 8, 2011).
117 See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Kuney, supra note 6, at 1 (“The
majority took pains to state that its decision was a narrow one . . . . This statement is belied by its
reasoning, which is broad and applicable to each of the 16 subsections of 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2),
which define the bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.”).
118 See infra notes 120-34.
119 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
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An apparent majority of bankruptcy courts maintain that Stern is
120
a point that Stern expressly made. Within
a very narrow holding
this camp, and at its narrowest, Stern only applies to proceedings that
121
mirror the unique circumstances of that case. This interpretation is
supported by the Court’s emphasis on the point that its holding was
122
“narrow” and applicable “in one isolated respect.” For further support, proponents of the idea that Stern’s holding was very limited posit
that, since Justice Scalia’s concurrence agreed to the ultimate outcome
of the case, but not the Chief Justice’s reasoning or underpinnings,
123
“the decision is a 4-4-1 plurality that must be ‘narrowly’ interpreted.”
Other courts within this camp acknowledge the inconsistencies between the Court’s ‘narrow’ holding and its far reaching rationales.
These courts include in their opinions a statement which provides that,
if on appeal the district court finds that the bankruptcy court exceeded it constitutional authority, the district court should treat the opin124
ion as a recommendation and not a final order.
By contrast, courts employing the broad interpretation of Stern
125
look beyond its holding and rely heavily on the Court’s reasoning.
Parties to a case that assert this position will argue that “Stern strips
bankruptcy courts of authority to enter a final judgment in any case
where the debtor is bringing any action which seeks to augment the
estate because they are legal actions that seek to take another’s prop120 See id. at 2620 (“[T]he question presented here is a ‘narrow’ one . . . . We conclude today
that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation”); see, e.g., In re Safety Harbor
Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Debtor reads Stern too broadly.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Stern was very narrow. The Supreme Court merely held that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution in one isolated instance by granting
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final judgments on counterclaims that are not necessarily
resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”); In re Wilderness, 2011 WL
5417098, at *2 (“Although the multifarious rationales in Stern are quite broad, the holding is
mercifully narrow.”); In re Crescent Res., LLC, 457 B.R. 506, 510 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011)
(opining that Stern should be applied narrowly); In re McClelland, 460 B.R. at 401 (“In Stern v.
Marshall, the Supreme Court held that one kind of “core” proceeding, that of counterclaims of
the estate against parties filing proofs of claim, was unconstitutional in that it violated the separation of powers doctrine.”); see also Kurz v. EMAK Worldwide, Inc., 464 B.R. 635, 645 n.6
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (finding that Stern’s holding is very limited).
121 See, e.g., In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Stern is replete with language emphasizing that the ruling should be limited to the unique
circumstances of that case.”); see also In re Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 638
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
122 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
123 In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 644.
124 See In re Hudson, 455 B.R. 648, 656-57 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“Except for the types
of counterclaims addressed in Stern v. Marshall, a bankruptcy judge remains empowered to enter
final orders in all core proceedings . . . . If this court’s order is appealed, and the district court
decides this court is not constitutionally authorized to issue a final order in this adversary proceeding, this opinion should be treated as a report and recommendation.”).
125 See, e.g., In re Blixseth, No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).
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erty and can only be finally adjudicated by an Article III judge.” A
court’s decision to employ a broad interpretation is partly justified by
the fact that, while dicta is not binding, the Court’s dicta carries great
127
weight. In addition, judicial dicta – contrasted with obiter dicta –
128
should not be ignored.
These concepts are even more pertinent
when applying Stern, because of the cardinal principles the Court ad129
dressed before getting to its ultimate conclusion.
For example, the Court stated that Congress may not encroach on
the authority of Article III judges by delegating matters “made of ‘the
stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by courts at Westminster in 1789 . . . and . . . brought within the bounds of federal juris130
diction” to non-Article III courts. Further, the Court stated that the
bankruptcy court exceeded its constitutional authority by “purporting
to resolve and enter final judgment on a state common law claim . . .
independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolv131
able by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy.” These broad assertions by the Court may effectively rebut the idea that
Stern is applicable only in limited instances: these assertions encapsulate fundamental constitutional principles that need to be applied by
all courts.
Similarly, as Professor Kuney points out, although the Court stated that its holding is narrow, its reasoning seemingly applies to other
sections of the Code dealing with claims which “would have been the
132
sort heard by the courts at Westminster in 1789.” For instance, “nonbankruptcy law counterclaims, especially mandatory counterclaims
arising out of the same core of operative facts, in particular are impli-

126

In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 638.
See Robert G. Scofield, The Distinction Between Judicial Dicta And Obiter Dicta: Unlike
Obiter Dicta, Which Are Not Binding, Judicial Dicta Carry Great Authority, 25 L.A. LAW. 17
(2002).
128 Id. at 17 (“Obiter dicta are ‘by the way’ statements. Since courts usually do not give as
serious consideration to the statements they make in passing as they do to the ratio decidendi,
the statements do not constitute the binding part of a judicial precedent . . . . But judicial dicta
are the product of a comprehensive discussion of legal issues and therefore should be granted
greater weight than obiter dicta. Judicial dicta should be followed unless they are erroneous or
there are particularly strong reasons for not doing so.”).
129 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
130 Id. at 2609.
131 Id. at 2611.
132 Kuney, supra note 6, at 9. Professor Kuney explains that Stern could easily apply to 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (matters concerning the administration of the estate), § 157(b)(2)(F)
(preference avoidance and recovery), § 157(b)(2)(H) (“proceedings to determine, avoid, or
recover fraudulent conveyances” whether under incorporation of state law through 11 U.S.C. §
544 or under § 548), and § 157(b)(2)(O) (“other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the
assets of the estate”).
127
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133

cated . . . .” Professor Kuney further states that if a bankruptcy court
decides that a claim is the kind normally heard at Westminster in 1798
then the court cannot enter final judgment, and it also lacks authority
to issue a recommendation to the district court, as this is only availa134
ble for non-core matters, absent consent.
To date, the broadest interpretation given to Stern may very well
135
be that of the court in In re Blixseth. The position in Blixseth has led
136
other courts to expressly differ. After a thorough analysis of Stern,
Blixseth’s conclusions were that: (1) “[u]nlike in non-core proceedings,
a bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to render findings of
fact and conclusions of law for core proceedings that it may not con137
stitutionally hear”; and (2) parties’ consent cannot authorize a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment where it would not be able to
138
otherwise. By taking this position, the Blixseth court has gone beyond what Stern identified as its narrow holding, and has opted to apply the dicta instead.
Whether courts subscribe to a narrow or broad interpretation,
one common thread is the detailed, full-length analysis courts engage
in to dissect Stern. In this methodological approach, many courts construct and apply tests. For example, in In re Olde Prairie Block Owner,
139
LLC, to determine jurisdiction, the court asked whether as an Article I court it could enter final judgment on the debtor’s counterclaims
as a core proceeding under § 157(b), provided the counterclaims rulings were required to adjudicate the claim itself, or whether the claims
140
were non-core but otherwise related and parties consented.
The
court also noted that Stern required that “each Counterclaim Count
141
must be separately analyzed.” Further, the court stated that after
Stern, bankruptcy judges’ authority with regards to ‘core’ claims have
142
been limited. After an analysis of much of Stern’s dicta, the court

133

Kuney, supra note 6, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
135 No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011).
136 See, e.g., In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 459 B.R. 573, 578 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Respectfully, I believe Blixseth is incorrect and I decline to follow it.”); In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466 B.R. 750, 770 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (“Although the Blixseth court found that the
consent of the parties cannot authorize a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a cause
of action . . . the overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that ‘the bankruptcy court has
authority to render final judgments even in non-core proceedings with the consent of the parties.’”).
137 In re Blixseth, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12.
138 Id.
139 457 B.R. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill .2011).
140 Id. at 696-97.
141 Id.
142 Id.
134
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ultimately stated that the holding was narrow, but it was not limited to
the counterclaim at issue in Stern; the court found the holding also
143
applied to “others substantially like it.”
144
Similarly, in In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., after a
careful examination of much of the Court’s dicta, the court concluded
145
that Stern provided a two-prong test. After a review of Stern’s discussion on the lack of authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final
orders in “non-bankruptcy matters that are based on the common law
or state law,” the court stated that the Stern test asks: “whether the
action stems from bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved
146
in the claims allowance process.” If either prong is answered in the
147
affirmative, a bankruptcy court has authority to enter a final order.
If neither prong is satisfied, the bankruptcy court can only enter find148
ings of fact and conclusions of law.
2. Questioning Fraudulent Conveyance Actions
Post-Stern, many courts have faced the question of whether a
bankruptcy court can finally adjudicate a fraudulent conveyance ac149
tion. This question is a direct function of the Supreme Court’s broad
reasoning in the decision, which potentially applies to other subsec150
tions of the Code. Among courts adopting the broad interpretation,
one view is that the statutory grant of authority to adjudicate fraudulent conveyances is constitutionally suspect in lieu of Stern and
151
Granfinanciera, combined. This camp concludes that, while a bankruptcy judge may issue a report and recommendation, after
Granfinanciera and Stern, it is apparent that bankruptcy courts may
152
not enter final judgment in fraudulent conveyance actions.
In support of this conclusion, statutory authority notwithstanding,
Eric Brunstad, in an Amicus Brief, made a persuasive argument sup153
ported by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern. Brunstad con143

Id. at 698.
466 B.R. 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
145 Id. at 768.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “reasonable
people may differ over whether Stern’s prohibition on the bankruptcy court’s issuance of a final
judgment extends to fraudulent transfer claims”, and providing a laundry list of cases that take
divergent positions on the issue).
150 See Kuney, supra notes 6 and 132.
151 In re Teleservices Grp. Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
152 See id.
153 Brief for G. Eric Brunstad as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 665 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) [herein144
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cluded that bankruptcy courts may enter final judgment only where
the parties have expressly consented because, as Stern stated, fraudulent conveyance suits are “quintessential[] suits at common law,” and
are more “accurately characterized as private rather than a public
154
right.” In addition, “even with respect to matters that arguably fall
within the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presumption is in
155
favor of Art. III courts.” And, where a proof of claim has been filed,
a bankruptcy court can only adjudicate where the “action would nec156
essarily be resolved in the process of ruling on” that claim. Brunstad
further reasoned that where a bankruptcy court improperly issues a
final order on a fraudulent conveyance action, an Article III court
may adequately cure the defect by treating the decision as a submission of “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law” subject to
157
de novo review.
To rebut this argument, narrow-interpretation courts point out
that Stern did not address the question of whether bankruptcy courts
can enter final orders in fraudulent conveyance actions, and it is, in
fact, replete with language indicating that the case should be read nar158
rowly. Further, to extend Stern to fraudulent transfer actions, based
on the Court’s dicta would “upend the division of labor between district and bankruptcy courts that has been in effect for nearly thirty
159
years.” Proponents of this view further argue that, even under the
broad interpretation, bankruptcy courts may still finally adjudicate
fraudulent transfers because these actions arise only in bankruptcy. To
support this position, and conclude that fraudulent transfer actions are
160
core, the court in In re Custom Contractors engaged in the following
analysis:
[C]laims asserted by the Trustee are authorized by, and arise under §§ 544(b) and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Such claims “may
after Brunstad Br.]. Brunstad has argued several cases in front of the US Supreme Court, lectures at Yale, and is a contributing author for the Collier treatise on bankruptcy law. Brunstad’s
profile can be found on his firm’s website. See G. Eric Brunstad Jr., DECHERT, LLP,
http://www.dechert.com/eric_brunstad/ (last visited June 29, 2013).
154 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (2011); Brunstad Br., supra note 153, at 9.
155 Brunstad Br., supra note 153, at 23 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618).
156 Id. at 24 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620).
157 Id. at 14.
158 In re Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. 901, 906 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
159 Id. at 908; see also In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, *6
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that “After Stern, some courts have concluded that they cannot
hear fraudulent conveyance claims as core proceedings. They are focusing on the dicta of Stern,
not its holding. I believe that this approach thrusts unnecessary burdens on already overworked
district courts, especially when bankruptcy courts have a particular expertise in and familiarity
with avoidance actions.”).
160 Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. at 901.
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only be prosecuted by a bankruptcy trustee on behalf of a bankruptcy estate, and because a trustee and a bankruptcy estate are
strictly creatures of the Bankruptcy Code, there would be no legal basis for this action were there no bankruptcy estate.” (citation omitted) These claims simply would not exist but for the
bankruptcy. (citation omitted) The analysis does not change because § 544(b) authorizes a trustee to avoid a transfer that could
be recovered under state law by an actual creditor of the debtor.
(citation omitted) This action is not prosecuted by one of the
debtor’s creditors to avoid a transfer under state law, but by a
bankruptcy trustee as the official representative of the bankruptcy estate to avoid prepetition transfers under the Bankruptcy
Code. (citation omitted) Although § 544 incorporates state law to
provide the “rules of decision,” the claim still arises under § 544
which is a federal bankruptcy cause of action stemming from the
bankruptcy itself. (citation omitted) In addition, “[a] determination that a proceeding is not a core proceedings shall not be
made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by
161
State law.” (citation omitted)
To substantiate the position that fraudulent transfers are core
162
proceedings, one may reference Thomas , where the Supreme Court
recognized that, in rare cases, Congress “may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited in163
volvement by the Article III judiciary.” On the flip side, however,
this argument is weakened by the Court’s position in Granfinanciera
and Stern, that fraudulent conveyance actions are “more accurately
164
characterized as a private rather than a public right,” and they are
“not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program that Con165
gress has power to enact.”
In this sea of uncertainty, where courts are struggling to reconcile
apparent inconsistencies in Stern, one thing seems sure – Stern has left
the door open for a continuance of jurisdictional disputes. Courts, like
166
the one in Blixseth, seem to refuse to wait for the reprimand that is
161 Id. at 907. In its analysis, the Court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3); In re Bujak, No. 1003569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, *2-3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011); In re Heller Ehrman, 2011 WL
4542512, at *5; and In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 2011 WL 5553280, *3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 15,
2011).
162 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
163 Id.
164 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (2011).
165 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-56 (1989).
166 See In re Blixseth, No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 5509484 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011) (placing as
much emphasis on Stern’s dicta as it does the holding).
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almost sure to come years down the line, and give as much weight to
Stern’s dicta as its holding. Other courts, however, while cognizant of
the fact that years from now the Supreme Court may use Stern as a
platform to invalidate other portions of the Code, are grounded in
knowing that “the job of bankruptcy courts is to apply the law as it is
written and interpreted today. Bankruptcy courts should not invalidate a Congressional statute . . . or otherwise limit its authority to finally resolve other core proceedings—simply because dicta in Stern
167
suggests the Supreme Court may do the same down the road.”
B.

Impact and Consequences
1. Inefficiency and Case Overload

The dissent in Stern, penned by Justice Breyer, was first to highlight that the decision, as a practical matter, has the potential to result
168
in an inefficient bankruptcy process. It is very common for counterclaims that resemble suits at common law and that involve the same
factual disputes as core claims, to arise during bankruptcy proceed169
ings. As Justice Breyer warned, “[A] constitutionally required game
of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts would lead to inefficiency,
increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among those
170
faced with bankruptcy.” There are particular efficiency and cost concerns in the present socio-economic climate, where thousands of debtors striving to save their homes from foreclosure will likely face motions seeking to move these cases to district court, which is a favorite
171
forum for creditors.

167 See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)
(explaining that although the Supreme Court may at a later date hold that section 157(b)(2)(F)
dealing with fraudulent conveyances is unconstitutional, the job of courts are to apply the law as
is). The court also noted that the “Supreme Court does not ordinarily decide important questions of law by cursory dicta.” Id. (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968)). In agreement with the decision by the In re Safety court to not extend Stern’s limited
holding, the judge in In re BankUnited Fin. Corp. stated: “Moreover, I am not going to be one of
those bankruptcy judges who seizes on, and seeks to analyze, every line in the Stern opinion to
determine what ripples may emerge from the self-described isolated pebble dropped in the
jurisdictional waters.” 462 B.R. 885, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
168 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kuney,
supra note 6, at 1 (“As a result, each assertion of core jurisdiction is now open for challenge and
is subject to uncertainty. Without legislative action, this uncertainty will only be clarified through
the lengthy process of litigation in each of the various federal circuits, a process that has already
begun and that will continue for some time, at great expense.”).
169 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2626, 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 2630.
171 See Lieb, supra note 24, at 463-64; Patrick Scott, Supreme Court Addresses Limits On
Bankruptcy Judges’ Powers, 33 NO. 21 WESTLAW J. ASBESTOS 12, 4 (2011).
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It is already evident that Stern has become the mantra for strategic and tactical litigants, who would rather litigate in a forum other
172
than the bankruptcy court. A survey of cases post-Stern reveal that
litigants are raising Stern for a plethora of issues, thereby extending
173
the case beyond its intended effect. To highlight a few, Stern is being
174
used to challenge the following: subject matter jurisdiction; bank175
ruptcy courts’ authority to hear claims based on state law; the bank176
ruptcy courts on the issue of consent; the bankruptcy court’s authori177
ty in Chapter 5 actions; and especially, the bankruptcy court’s au178
thority in fraudulent conveyance actions. Practicing in bankruptcy
court may very well have become too focused on gamesmanship instead of argument; for example, parties may choose to wait until the

172

In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See infra notes 174-78.
174 See, e.g., In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 459 B.R. 573, 574-75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (“The
Defendant also asserts that the bankruptcy court lacks subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Defendant’s jurisdictional argument is based on the recent Supreme Court decision, Stern v. Marshall.”);
see also New York v. Fairchild Corp. (In re Fairchild Corp.), 452 B.R. 525, 530 n.14 (Bankr. D. Del.
2011) (“Stern v. Marshall is not a case about subject matter jurisdiction. Rather it addresses the
power of the bankruptcy court to enter final orders, assuming that subject matter jurisdiction
exists.”); In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, *2 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2011) (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607) (“Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between the bankruptcy court and the district court. [] That allocation does not implicate
questions of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
175 See, e.g., In re Soo Bin Kim, No. 10-54472-C, 2011 WL 2708985, *2 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
2011) (“Defendant has suggested that this court cannot hear any of this matter because it touches on probate issues, and cites the Supreme Court recent decision in Stern v. Marshall . . . . The
defendant overreads that case and its application to this proceeding.”); see also In re Salander
O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that from Stern’s narrow
holding it is clear that “the Bankruptcy Court is empowered to apply state law when doing so
would finally resolve a claim”); In re Byce, No. 1:11-CV-00378-BLW, 2011 WL 6210938, *2-3 (D.
Idaho 2011) (“The bankruptcy court thus has constitutional authority to finally determine
JustMed’s claim – including state-law issues that arise within that claim. Stern did not hold that
the bankruptcy court may not rule on state law issues when determining a proof of claim . . . .
Again, it was not the mere presence of state law issues that drove the Stern decision . . . .”).
176 See, e.g., Mercury Cos., Inc. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 780 (D. Colo.
2011) (“Defendants argue, inter alia, that one cannot consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction where the Bankruptcy Court does not have the authority to resolve claims before it.”).
177 See, e.g., In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC, No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098, *1 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 2011) (“With the benefit of case development and further reflection, however, this
court is unwilling to automatically extend the dicta in Stern to default judgment motions under
Chapter 5 . . . .”).
178 See, e.g., In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“The
IRS argues that although it admitted in its Answer that this is a core proceeding, the intervening
decision in Stern v. Marshall limits the Court’s authority to enter a final order in this fraudulent
transfer action.”); In re Bujak, No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011)
(“Relying upon an extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stern v. Marshall . . . , the County
argues that this Bankruptcy Court lacks constitutional power to enter a final judgment on Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims, and as a result, the claims are dismissed.”).
173
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179

eve of trial before raising objections. Debtors in this context “are
not likely to have the financial resources to oppose such proceedings
180
that financial institutions can afford to pursue.” Additional risks of
delay, uncertainty and increased costs are exacerbated by the fact that
a party may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any stage of the
case; doing so could result in upsetting a final order in a case based on
181
a last-minute jurisdictional plea.
On the other hand, arguably, Stern really changes nothing as
bankruptcy courts will continue to hear all non-core claims involved in
proceedings, submit findings as proposals – as opposed to final orders
– and district courts will simply imprint their stamp of approval. Additionally, parties have always had the opportunity to appeal to the dis182
trict court from final orders entered by bankruptcy judges. In this
business-as-usual atmosphere, parties will come out with “two pieces
of paper from two different courts, and a useless extra helping of delay
183
and expense.”
Further, at most, Stern has exacerbated certain defects in the
bankruptcy process, but it sure did not create them, as the significant
delay and expense involved in bankruptcy proceedings are attributa184
ble to the American hybrid, two-tiered bankruptcy system. Where
185
bankruptcy is infused with state substantive law, and claims akin to
186
those at common law are commonplace during the process, the current statutory structure – jurisdiction to district courts and bankruptcy
187
courts authority dependent on core versus non-core distinction – is a
breeding ground for uncertainty, delay and litigation over jurisdiction.
This system is the cradle for the endless back-and-forth between the
Supreme Court and Congress on the authority of bankruptcy judges.
2. Forum Shopping
In addition to efficiency concerns, another proposition is that “the
principal significance of the Stern decision is that it will encourage a
permissible type of forum-shopping” – especially in favor of creditordefendants, who “most often prefer the fact finder to be a district
188
judge.” In other words, “creditors facing state law claims by a bank179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

See, e.g., In re Peacock, 455 B.R. 810, 812-14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
Lieb, supra note 24, at 464.
Id. at 467.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.
Schechter, supra note 111, at 51.
See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26.
Id.
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Block-Lieb, supra note 57.
Scott, supra note 171, at 4.
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ruptcy estate may choose between the bankruptcy judge and a district
189
court as the fact finder in the case.” As the impact of Stern starts to
manifest, the issue of forum-shopping has become evident: litigants
are seeking to forum-shop by tactfully making very creative argu190
ments, very late in the case, based on Stern. For example, in one case
the plaintiff tried to get out of bankruptcy court by arguing lack of
consent, when the case was well under way; the court retorted that
191
plaintiff’s actions was nothing but a “variation of forum shopping.”
Forum-shopping is not a unique product of Stern. Rather, it has
192
been a problem since the inception of bankruptcy courts. Forum
shopping has been “problematic with amendments to the Act
193
throughout the twentieth century,” partly fueled by the vagueness of
28 U.S.C. § 157, which embodies bankruptcy’s jurisdictional struc194
ture. The indefinite wording of the statute left much up to the discretion of bankruptcy courts in determining what is a ‘core’ proceed195
Hence, pre-dating Stern, “forum-shopping problem[s] [arose]
ing.
when core jurisdiction [was] viewed expansively, so as to effectively
place bankruptcy judges on an equal footing with state courts and Ar196
ticle III federal courts” in disputes that were independent of the fed197
eral bankruptcy statutory scheme. Stern has curbed this problem to
the extent that parties no longer have an option in bankruptcy courts
for proceedings that are “not resolved in the process of ruling on a
198
creditor’s proof of claim” or based in federal bankruptcy law.
In addition, the American hybrid bankruptcy system – a federal
system ingrained with substantive entitlements and rules based on
199
state laws – creates the challenge and almost erases any chance of
parties choosing their forum in a non-opportunistic way. The antidote
to having the resolution of a dispute contingent on the forum in which
the dispute is adjudicated was to make the bankruptcy court a place

189

Id. at 1.
See supra notes 174-78; In re Bayonne Med. Ctr., No. 07-15195, 2011 WL 5900960, *6
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2011) (“The plaintiff’s late-day tactical change of heart will not be permitted. It is
a variation of forum-shopping, undertaken only after full exposition by both sides of the contested issue and expansive court inquiry into and colloquy regarding the merits of various positions
of the parties.”).
191 See In re Bayonne Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 5900960, at *6.
192 See Cole, supra note 25, at 517.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 521.
195 See id.
196 Id. at 520.
197 See id.
198 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
199 See Cole, supra note 25, at 515.
190
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200

with special procedures and no special substantive law. Over the
years, however, litigants have been able to use the bankruptcy system
to gain better results than they would in a state system, thanks to the
201
vagueness of the statutory scheme. Vickie was initially able, for example, to take her case to the bankruptcy court and win on state law
counterclaims, where the state probate court had ruled in Pierce’s fa202
vor. The problem of forum shopping, therefore, existed way before
Stern. Furthermore, creditors still had some ability to choose between
a bankruptcy judge and a district court judge prior to Stern in cases
where a jury trial was required and where the creditor had not filed a
203
proof of claim.
3. Prolongation of the Tension Between Article III Judges and
Bankruptcy Judges
The Court’s decision in Stern expresses a lack of confidence in
the ability of bankruptcy judges to rule with “clear heads” and “honest
hearts” in the absence of Article III protections that make the judiciary immune to any inappropriate coercion from other branches of
204
government. One concern, however, is that the true undercurrent of
the decision is Article III courts’ lack of confidence in the bankruptcy
205
courts. This concern is not unfounded; as discussed above, there has
been a stigma, almost disdain, attached to debtors and insolvency
206
since the Roman Empire, which transfused into American society.
And it is no secret that Article III judges have not been immune to
207
prevailing stereotypes of the bankruptcy system.
208
The Judicial Conference, made up of Article III judges , was
strongly opposed to Congress’ intent to grant Article III status to
bankruptcy courts, pursuant to recommendations by the House Judiciary Committee during the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code of
200

See id. at 512.
See id. at 521.
202 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006).
203 Scott, supra note 171, at 1.
204 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).
205 The Calvo court, citing Stern, made it a point to specify the reduced deference owed
bankruptcy courts interpreting state law, as opposed to that given to federal courts. See Calvo v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 199 Cal. App. 4th 118, 123 n.2 (2011) (“Plaintiff cited only one bankruptcy court decision in support of her argument that section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust.
We find the analysis in that case unpersuasive. Holdings of the federal courts are not binding or
conclusive on California courts, though they may be entitled to respect and careful consideration.
A federal bankruptcy court decision interpreting California law, however, is not due the same
deference.”).
206 See supra notes 43-48.
207 See Coco, supra note 15.
208 See id.
201
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209

Former District Judge, Simon Rifkind, and former Circuit
1978.
Judge, Attorney General Griffin Bell, opposed granting Article III
status to bankruptcy judges because “it ‘would dilute the significance,
and prestige, of district judgeships’” and “diminish the . . . influence of
210
our district courts.” Chief Justice Warren Burger shared the same
sentiment, and went as far as to make a personal supplication to the
211
President to exercise the presidential veto. The Chief Justice went
212
under fire for breaching separation of power delineations, but he
probably thought it worth it in the end, as ultimately bankruptcy
213
courts were not granted Article III status.
Explanation for this bizarre behavior on the part of members of
the Judicial Conference may be attributed to a “sort of an ego trip” or
214
jealousy of power. Another perspective is that the stigma attached
to bankruptcy has relegated the practice to a subordinate position in
215
the legal hierarchy. This position posits that, traditionally, within the
legal hierarchy bankruptcy has been an inferior field of legal practice,
216
in which bankruptcy attorneys were viewed to be of inferior caliber.
In addition, debt and financial failure has always been taboo in socie217
ties – past and present. Initially, bankruptcy was practiced by a marginalized group of lawyers, and more successful firms had no interest
218
in engaging in the practice. There was also a lack of uniform rules,
which made it an insider’s practice, and the appearance of the impar219
tiality became a major problem. A mixture of these reasons led to
220
bankruptcy occupying a subordinated position in the legal system.
As Professor Linda Coco has stated, this “bias is unsupported by
contemporary bankruptcy court judicial ability, expertise, and work
ethic, yet this perception, because it is accepted, operates to demoral209 See id.; see also Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7-11
(1985).
210 Countryman, supra note 209, at 9.
211 Coco, supra note 15, at 197.
212 Countryman, supra note 209, at 11.
213 Id. at 11-12.
214 See id. at 9 (stating that Judge Weinfeld was unable to deny that the real reason for
opposition by two other Article III judges was an ‘ego trip’ and an effort to hold onto power).
There have been parallels drawn between the egotistic reaction of judges during the drafting of
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and the Court’s holding in Stern. For example, in his discussion of
Stern, Professor Kuney states: “There is at least a hint of a bugle call to rally an embattled Article
III judiciary to protect its turf.” Kuney, supra note 6, at 2.
215 See Coco, supra note 15.
216 See id. at 202-26.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 209.
219 See id. at 213-26.
220 See id.
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ize what is arguably one of the most vital and essential judicial forums
221
in the United States today.” Whatever justifications existed in the
past for the inferior view of the bankruptcy practice are moot today in
light of the level of professionalism in the bankruptcy bar – and especially in light of the caliber of bankruptcy judges and their invaluable
222
contributions to American society.
4. Separation of Powers Issues and Consent
Another criticism of Stern is that it implicates separation of pow223
er issues. It seems to be, however, a repeat of the back-and-forth
between the Court and Congress in defining the limits of bankruptcy
224
courts as happened in 1978 and 1982. Now that § 157(b)(2)(C) –
which allows bankruptcy courts to hear counterclaims brought against
the estate – has been stricken, Congress may have to make some
changes, since the intent of the Act was to give bankruptcy courts
225
broad powers; as early as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress indicated that its intent was to expand the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and provide a single forum to adjudicate all issues relat226
ing to the administration of a bankruptcy case.
In Stern, the Court also left mixed signals as to the role of consent
227
in bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) allows bankruptcy
courts to enter final orders in ‘non-core’ proceedings, where the par228
After all the emphasis placed on the imties have consented.
portance of Article III safeguards and the preservation of separation
of powers, it seems unlikely, however, that the Court would find it ap221

Id. at 225.
See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 755 (2010) (“Moreover, the status and quality of the bankruptcy
bar in general, and the bankruptcy courts in particular, have risen in tandem in the last thirty
years as bankruptcy has regained its place of prominence in law practice.”). See also Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that bankruptcy courts
handled 1.6 million cases in 2010, compared to the federal courts’ 280,000 civil and 78,000 criminal cases). And this figure does not reflect adversary proceedings. In re Teleservices Grp. Inc.,
456 B.R. 318, 324 n.25 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
223 See, e.g., Kuney, supra note 6, at 1-2, 9 (stating that Stern “appears to be a reaction, a slap
back, to Congress’ practice of expansively defining the bankruptcy courts’ power,” and explaining that Stern could easily be used to invalidate other subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 157).
224 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26.
225 See id. at 385. But see Schecter, supra note 111, at 2 (stating that no congressional action
may be needed since section 157(b)(2)(C) was merely stricken and bankruptcy courts may still
hear non-core proceedings).
226 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 385-86.
227 See, e.g., Lieb, supra note 24, at 466 (“Although not directly addressed by the majority, it
is unclear whether express consent by the parties is, by itself, a sufficient basis upon which a
bankruptcy judge may adjudicate a common law claim.”).
228 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012).
222
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propriate for parties to bypass all these safeguards simply by consent229
ing to jurisdiction. For example, in Vickie’s instance, “Pierce repeatedly consented to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his defama230
tion claim against the estate.” Nevertheless, the Court concluded
231
that Pierce did not “truly consent,” which leaves the question of
whether consent is still a determinative factor, and, if so, what quality
of consent is required?
On the question of the quality of consent required, one view is
that simply filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings may be
insufficient since, unlike the party in Schor, he could have pursued his
claim in federal court, “[p]arallel reasoning is unavailable in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack an alternative
232
forum to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their claims.” Further, Stern seems to be a departure from the Court’s position in
233
Lagenkamp, that “even when private rights are at issues, non-Article
234
III adjudication may be appropriate when both parties consent.”
The dissent pointed out that there is no relevant distinction between
235
236
claims filed in Stern with those in Lagenkamp and Granfinanciera ,
and hence, Pierce’s filing of a proof of claim, in the light of precedent,
237
was ‘true’ consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Another perspective is that the commonsensical conclusion is
that Stern has left the role of consent intact, seeing that district judges
can allow parties before them to agree to final resolution of their is238
sues by binding arbitration. To interpret Stern any differently could
potentially create a case overload in district courts as not only would
the bankruptcy court not be able to enter judgment when parties consent – a process that significantly lightens the workload of district
courts – but also the ability of other Article I courts and magistrates to
239
do so would be called into question. And though post-Stern cases
evidence some hesitation about the role of consent, courts seem to be
in agreement that parties may still consent to the bankruptcy courts’
240
final adjudication of claims. Stern “recognized the value of waiver
229

See Lieb, supra note 24, at 466.
See Moody & Spector, supra note 18.
231 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (2011).
232 Brunstad Br., supra note 153, at 25.
233 Lagenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
234 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2628 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235 Lagenkamp, 498 U.S. at 42-44.
236 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
237 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2628 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 In re Teleservices Grp. Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
239 See In re Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. 901, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
240 See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In
re Peacock, 455 B.R. 810, 812-13 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
230
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241

and forfeiture rules” , and there is really no reason for the Supreme
242
Court to have held otherwise. In terms of the quality of consent required, courts on this side of the fence maintain that consent can be
implied; courts are willing to do so to prevent parties from sandbag243
ging the court, a practice even Stern disapproved of. Further, one
court, post-Stern, has stated that authority exists to support the conclusion that “even a mistaken admission of core jurisdiction acts as
244
consent.”
With the majority’s strict prohibitions on Congress even slightly
245
encroaching on Article III turf, Congress may have to change consent-based jurisdiction. In the meantime, there is sure to be a great
amount of litigation surrounding the role of consent and the validity
of section 157(c)(2). Failure to modify the consent provision makes it
even more likely that there will be further back-and-forth between
Congress and the judiciary on the question of bankruptcy court au246
thority; “the issue that just won’t go away.”
IV. SOLUTION TO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
As became evident in less than a year after Stern, a great deal of
resources – especially time and money – will be expended by parties
247
and by the courts, in an effort to interpret and enforce Stern. Without appropriate legislative action, every few years this game of pingpong will continue. The questioning of the bankruptcy court’s authori248
ty has been occurring since the inception of bankruptcy courts. Just
as it took the Supreme Court over twenty years after Northern Pipe249
line to rule that Congress’ attempt to define bankruptcy jurisdiction
241

In re Safety Harbor, 456 B.R. at 718 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608).
Id.; see also In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 338 (stating that had the defendant consented the court would have authority to enter final judgment on the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer action).
243 See, e.g., In re Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. at 909 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608). According to the Supreme Court in Stern, sandbagging occurs where a litigant “remain[s] silent
about his objection and belatedly rais[es] the error only if the case does not conclude in his
favor.” 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011).
244 See In re Peacock, 455 B.R. 810, 812-13 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
245 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
246 Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 529, 529 (1998).
247 See supra notes 179-81; see also Kuney, supra note 6 at 10 (“But because the case’s reasoning was so broad, each action brought under one of the 16 subsections of 157(b)(2) is now
subject to challenge and may be tested in litigation . . . [O]utcomes and conclusions on these
issues are difficult to predict and, absent statutory revision, splits of authority are likely across
the country.”).
248 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26.
249 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). This case was the
Supreme Court’s response to Congress’ attempt to broaden the powers of bankruptcy courts.
242
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in light of that case was invalid, Stern is an omen of future challenges
to the current bankruptcy system. A piecemeal fix by Congress will
not suffice. To rectify this waste of time and resources, and to prohibit
future violation of important constitutional principles, Congress
should bestow Article III status on bankruptcy courts, as it thought of
250
doing in 1978. This is not a novel proposition, but it is one that has
251
become fundamental after Stern.
Why should courts with “reputations for fast-paced, efficient, re252
sult-oriented adjudication” not have Article III status? Why should
the court that handled 1.6 million cases in 2010, compared to the federal courts’ 280,000 civil and 78,000 criminal cases, not be worthy of
253
Article III status? Why should the court that steered parties through
the tumultuous economic climate, replete with Ponzi schemes, of the
254
last few years, not also enjoy Article III protections? The time is
250

See Klee, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., William L. Norton & Richard Lieb, Restructuring The Bankruptcy Court in
1982: Congressional Constitutional Options, 1997 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 3, 76-77, 93 (1997)
(“The independent Bankruptcy Court system by Congress in 1978 is a good one. The sole missing element—Article II attributes—should now be supplied by Congress in order to implement
its 1978 policy of conferring unitary jurisdiction over bankruptcy litigation upon a single bankruptcy trial court . . . . The Bankruptcy Court has demonstrated its present ability to exercise the
broad jurisdiction and judicial powers conferred on it since October 1, 1979. It had been able to
handle a caseload that has increased beyond congressional expectations formulated at least five
years ago during the legislative processes. The Bankruptcy Court has become an engine of efficiency and has decided important issues that normally would have been decided in a District
Court or state courts in the absence of a bankruptcy case. A grant of de jure Article III status to
the Bankruptcy Court in essence would acknowledge its de facto Article III role. Official Article
III status with judges by Presidential appointment and Senatorial approval may result in further
improvement for a court that has already performed beyond reasonable expectations.”); BlockLieb, supra note 246, at 566 (“The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended to
Congress that ‘[t]he bankruptcy court should be established under Article III of the Constitution.’ It made this recommendation because the proposal ‘would create a constitutionally sound
structure and eliminate costly litigation over bankruptcy court authority’ . . . . To fractionalize
bankruptcy jurisdiction among bankruptcy, district and state courts diminishes the bankruptcy
goal of expeditious administration, especially given the substantial doctrinal and constitutional
uncertainty about just where these jurisdictional dividing lines are and ought to be. Fragmentation and uncertainty are the costs of a non-Article III bankruptcy court system.”); see also In re
Refco Inc., 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (pointing out that Stern has raised the issue
of “whether there is a gap in the statutory scheme preventing the [Bankruptcy] Court’s submission of proposed conclusions of law to the district court if a matter falls into the new ‘core but
precluded’ category”).
252 Kuney, supra note 6, at 2.
253 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition,
“the 1.6 million filings [J. Breyer] referenced do not reflect the numerous adversary proceedings
that were commenced in connection with those bankruptcy cases.” In re Teleservices Grp. Inc.,
456 B.R. 318, 324 n.25 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
254 See, e.g., Pacenti, supra note 18 (regarding the Rothstein Ponzi scheme); McKenzie,
supra note 222, at 748-49 (“How much power should we grant to bankruptcy judges? That question has taken on new prominence as lawmakers and commentators consider responses to the
financial crisis that contemplate an active role by bankruptcy courts . . . . Bankruptcy judges
251
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particularly appropriate in light of the many holes courts are poking
through the Code as they attempt, after in depth analysis of Stern and
255
prior precedent, to navigate constitutional boundaries. “The known
256
certainty of the law is the safety of all,” but bankruptcy practice
seems to be anything but certain at this point. As this Article has
shown, so many questions abound regarding the inconsistencies left by
Stern, and litigants’ results depend on whether they end up in a court
that is reading Stern narrowly or broadly. Agreeably, there is no “easy
257
solution” , but litigants and constitutional principles cannot afford
“what I suspect will be years of uncertainty as the bankruptcy process
258
grinds on.”
Even for those who find refuge in the fact that bankruptcy courts
can continue to hear claims and submit a report and recommendation
to the district court which then enter an order – more like rubber
stamp – the endless debate of which claims are core and which are
259
non-core remains. With courts coming out differently on this issue,
this hodgepodge proposition provides no real solution. Further, under
this approach, bankruptcy judges become nothing but the glorified
260
assistants of district courts, a result that runs contrary to Congress’
intent and one that yields little or no benefit to anyone – even district
261
judges. For this same reason, any bankruptcy system that in effect
similarly took center stage in debates about restructuring another swath of the national economy—the domestic automobile industry—as Chrysler and General Motors filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
255 See supra notes 115-61; see, e.g., In re Teleservices Grp. Inc., 456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011) (the court in approximately 30 pages discusses and analyzes Stern, its implications
and prior precedent); In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, No. 10-11282, 2012 WL 112192, *10
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (“On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall. Since
then, many litigants and courts have struggled to understand the Stern’s reasoning and apply its
holding.”).
256 U.S. v. Leech, 601 F. Supp. 956, 959 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (reciting the oft-quoted saying of
Lord Coke).
257 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 344.
258 Id.
259 See Norton and Lieb, supra note 251, at 85 (explaining that of the two Congressional
options, one is to revert to the referee system. This system is impractical for present bankruptcy
practice); Cole, supra note 25, at 519 (stating that the “distinction between core and non-core
matters is crucial, albeit elusive”).
260 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 327 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) stating that: “This, then, is why the lack of guidance in Stern is so
disappointing. Chipping away at Authority Section 157(b)(2) subpart by subpart is a disservice
to both the district courts and the bankruptcy courts if, in the end, the outcome is for the bankruptcy courts to have no independent authority at all . . . . However, unless some rationale is
found to justify a different outcome, Stern’s sweeping statements concerning Article III’s reach
portend a new world where my colleagues and I will in fact become only the functional equivalents of “magistrate judges, law clerks and the Judiciary’s administrative officials.”).
261 See id. at 324 (“One alternative would be to play it safe and simply refer without reflection every future determination I make to a district judge for his or her final review. However, I
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reverts to the “pre-1973 system does not offer practical choice.”
Such a system could not effectively address the mountainous work263
load of today’s bankruptcy system. And district courts have “little or
no present capacity to take on trial or administrative responsibility for
264
bankruptcy cases.” The only result of such a system would be to
265
wastefully duplicate the efforts of the bankruptcy and district courts.
Another suggestion may be that there is no need for Article III
status since parties can still consent, and, thereby allow bankruptcy
judges to adjudicate their claims. Waiver would be great but for the
fact that after Stern there is a real question, as has been discussed in
this article, about the role of consent. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court suggested that Pierce did consent, and that it would be inequi266
table to have him sandbag the court. On the other hand, however,
267
the Court stated that Pierce did not “truly consent” ; this begs the
question as to what constitutes sufficient waiver. Further, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would be so adamant about protecting constitutional boundaries, where it concludes that Congress has
encroached on the Judiciary, and give litigants the opportunity to disregard the system of checks and balances that Article III has in
268
place.
This point is substantiated by the Supreme Court’s discussion in
269
Schor: The Court, while acknowledging that a litigant may waive the
right to having an action heard in an Article III court, stated that this
270
is not an absolute principle. Where Article III safeguards of the role
of the Judiciary are implicated by “the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other . . . parties cannot by
consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the
parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter ju271
risdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III . . . .” Con-

do not see how I can do so in good faith given Authority Section 157(b)(3)’s direction that I must
decide even in instances when not requested whether I have the ability or not under that section
to enter a final order. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). Moreover, I suspect that the Article III judges in
my district would not be pleased with the extra workload such an approach would impose upon
them.”).
262 Norton and Lieb, supra note 251, at 85.
263 Id. at 85-86.
264 Id. at 85.
265 Id.
266 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011).
267 Id. at 2614.
268 See id.
269 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-51 (1986).
270 Id. at 848-51.
271 Id. at 850-51.
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sent, in this scenario, is not dispositive and a number of factors must
272
be taken in account.
Another indication that consent may not be the “cure all,” is the
Supreme Court’s shift in Stern, from the practical approach taken in
Schor, to a greater reliance on substantive principles underlying con273
stitutional delineations among the branches. As the dissenting opin274
275
ion in Stern highlighted, Schor and Thomas allowed for a more
pragmatic approach in determining the adjudicatory authority of a
276
non-Article III judge; that is, de minimis intrusion on Judicial Branch
was permissible to avoid practical negative consequences of a formal277
istic approach. That being said, consent still plays an important role
not only in bankruptcy courts but also in other Article I settings; for
example, where parties consent, a Magistrate can enter final judgment
278
after hearing a civil case. After Stern, however, and in light of prior
279
precedent, it is apparent that consent will not be the cure all for
some of the issues that continue to plague bankruptcy courts. Establishing Article III bankruptcy courts will be the most effective course
of action going forward.
If this is such a rational choice, why has it not taken effect? The
answer seems to lie in the politics and egos involved in the undercurrent. In fact, these were prominent issues that surfaced and dominat280
ed as part of the debate on bankruptcy reform in the 1970s. As noted earlier on, Article III judges, many of whom served on the Judicial
Conference, were very vocal about their fear that their prestige would
281
be diluted if bankruptcy judges were accorded Article III status. But
as this article has noted, whatever bankruptcy practice may have been
decades ago that led to this stigma, today such ideological concerns
should be nonexistent as bankruptcy judges are deemed to be some of
282
the most brilliant, professional, and capable judges.

272

Id. at 851.
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)
274 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
275 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
276 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2624 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
277 Id. at 2624-29.
278 In re Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. 901, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
279 See supra notes 229-37.
280 See Countryman, supra note 209; Coco, supra note 15.
281 See Countryman, supra note 209, at 9.
282 See McKenzie, supra note 222, at 755 (“Moreover, the status and quality of the bankruptcy bar in general, and the bankruptcy courts in particular, have risen in tandem in the last
thirty years as bankruptcy has regained its place of prominence in law practice.”). See also Coco,
supra note 15, at 225 (“This bias is unsupported by contemporary bankruptcy court judicial
ability, expertise, and work ethic . . . .”).
273
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As far as Congress is concerned, establishing specialized Article
III courts is not a novel concept, and it has been successfully accom283
plished in the past. The bifurcated nature of American bankruptcy
practice makes it the perfect candidate for the Article I-to-III transition. As Professor McKenzie explained, the current structure of the
bankruptcy courts does not fit the conventional justification for non284
Article III tribunals. First, appellate review may not be a sufficient
check on bankruptcy courts, as only a relatively small percentage of
285
decisions get appealed. Second, matters handled by the bankruptcy
286
courts are not narrow and technical. Rather, bankruptcy courts handle a broad spectrum of issues; that is, bankruptcy is a specialized process, but it has no specialized substance as bankruptcy judges address
“matters sounding in contract, tort, property, labor, and almost every
287
other area of civil law.” Bankruptcy cases “routinely implicate non288
bankruptcy-specific rules of decision,” which further implicate eco289
nomic and social policy. Because of this, bankruptcy judges are not
290
as insulated from political interest, as some may think.
V. CONCLUSION
Stern has done a great job of reminding us of the many problems
that underline the American hybrid, bifurcated bankruptcy system.
Unfortunately, the decision muddied the waters a lot more on issues
such as the role of consent. At the end of the day, however, it feels
more like déjà vu – that is, it takes us back roughly 20 years to the
shuffle between the Supreme Court and Congress regarding the Reform Act and Northern Pipeline. This jurisdictional game, tainted by
politics and a great amount of ego, will continue until Congress makes
the most logical and productive move to bestow bankruptcy courts
with Article III status. The need for certainty in bankruptcy practice
and cardinal constitutional principles, demand an end to this jurisdictional ping-pong. But until Congress fixes it, and fixes it well, this
game continues.
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